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This paper studies government funding for scientiﬁc research. Funds
must be distributed among diﬀerent research institutions and allocated
between basic and applied research. Informational constraints prevent
less productive institutions to be given any government funding. In order
to internalise the beneﬁcial eﬀects of research, the government requires
the most productive institutions to carry out more applied research than
they would like. Funding for basic research is used by the government to
induce more productive institutions to carry out more applied research
then they would like.
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A very large amount of taxpayers’ money is spent on scientiﬁc research. In
2008 in the OECD countries, government expenditure on R&D amounted to
around 0.8% of GDP (OECD 2009). These funds are channelled in many diﬀer-
ent ways, from dedicated research centres, to universities and similar public or
private education providers, to subsidies to private non-proﬁto rp r o ﬁtm a k i n g
organisations. Also varied is the link between the funds provided and their
destination: some funding is linked to speciﬁc research projects, some is sim-
ply awarded to institutions to spend as they see ﬁt, some is distributed in
consideration of past achievement.
This variety raises immediate eﬃciency questions. How should the total
funding be allocated across diﬀerent institutions? Is the multiplicity of manners
in which these sums of money are assigned a good thing? Would it be possible
to re-allocate funding from one spendingm e t h o dt oa n o t h e ra n di m p r o v ei t s
impact on society? Should the funding agency be concerned with the nature,
basic or applied, of the research carried out by the institutions which it funds?
This paper provides a theoretical framework to address these questions: the
aim here is to provide a theory of the optimal public research spending.
The approach is microeconomic: I leave the macroeconomic aspect of total
spending in the background, and concentrate instead on the two interrelated
questions of the balance between basic and applied research and of the distri-
bution of funding among diﬀerent research institutions. I make the plausible
assumption that research institutions diﬀer in their characteristics. Diﬀerences
among institutions create a non-trivial optimisation problem: the government
wishes to allocate resources to the institutions where they are most productive,
and at the same time to ensure the “right” balance between basic and applied
research. As my analysis shows, these two requirements interact with each
other: the government uses basic research funding — more precisely, funding
that the recipient institutions will choose to devote to basic research —, as a
reward to induce more productive institutions to do more applied research. If,
plausibly, the government’s and the institutions’ objectives are not perfectly
aligned, this generates a distortion from an eﬃcient allocation, that is an al-
location where the social marginal beneﬁt is the same for basic and applied
1research and the same for all institutions. A further distortion is the concen-
tration of research towards the most eﬀective institutions. Relatively ineﬃcient
institutions do not receive any funding even though small scale projects would
be cheaper to carry out than in larger funded institutions.
The relative role of applied and basic research, at the centre of my study,
requires their speciﬁc characteristics to be carefully identiﬁed and modelled
accurately. The distinguishing feature I posit in this paper is that it is harder
to observe whether basic research has been been carried out than it is for ap-
plied research. This relates closely to the deﬁnitions oﬀered in the literature.
Typically, basic research, also labelled fundamental, pure, curiosity-driven, up-
stream, unpredictable (see Strandburg 2005), is seen as driven by scientists’ cu-
riosity, its aim to acquire knowledge for knowledge’s sake, in contrast to applied
research, designed to solve practical problems.1 In many cases a hierarchical
link is posited between basic and applied research: the former precedes and
provides the foundation to the latter (for example, Evenson and Kislev 1976,
or more recently Aghion et al. 2008). Since my model is static, the hierarchi-
c a ll i n kIp o s i ti sn o tt e m p o r a l ,b u ti nt h en a t u r eo ft h ec o n n e c t i o nb e t w e e n
research and its eﬀect: applied research has a direct impact on the nation’s
income, whereas basic research has a direct impact only on the cost of carrying
out applied research: applied research becomes “easier”, cheaper, more likely
to succeed, and so on, when the body of basic research available to society is
bigger. Related to this is the diﬀerence in the “directness” of the link between
research eﬀort and the realisation of the beneﬁcial eﬀects of this eﬀort. Sim-
plifying somewhat, all research is uncertain, but, while in the case of applied
research the uncertainty regards whether or not a certain line of research will
be successful, that is whether or not a given, known problem is “solved”, in
the case of basic research it is also unknown in advance where a positive eﬀect
will emerge, if it does.2 I capture this unpredictability with the assumption
1See, for example, the deﬁnition used by the US National Science Foundation to classify
expenditure: “basic research is deﬁned as systematic study directed toward fuller knowledge
or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and of observable facts without
speciﬁc applications towards processes or products in mind.” Conversely, “applied research
is deﬁned as systematic study to gain knowledge or understanding necessary to determine
the means by which a recognized and speciﬁc need may be met.” (NSB 2008, p 7).
2Nelson (1959 pp 301—2) gives several examples of basic research projects pursued as
2of a completely diﬀuse link between pure and applied research: each applied
research project is helped equally by the total amount of basic research under-
taken in society. Basic research thus bestows an externality. This, however,
does not create the appropriability problems which beset R&D activities car-
ried out in proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, well-understood by t h el i t e r a t u r es i n c ea t
least Arrow (1962). This is both because all eﬀects of research are internal to
the government, which funds research,3 and because individuals and institu-
tions doing research are not concerned with its monetary appropriability: their
reward is the production of knowledge, not its ﬁnancial exploitation, as has
long been recognised (see Stephan 1996 for a comprehensive review).
The optimal funding structure for the centralised funding mechanism de-
rived in Section 3 illustrates how information constraints force the government
to use basic research as a reward to the more productive institutions to induce
them to perform more applied research. This is ineﬃcient, both because the
marginal rate of return of funds is diﬀerent across institutions, and because, for
some institutions, the marginal social return is diﬀerent for funds they allocate
to basic and applied research. Moreover, institutions which could do research
cheaply on a small scale are not funded at all.
The paper next shows how the optimal funding can be implemented in
practice. I show that the dual funding system suggests itself naturally: all
an end in themselves, which unexpectedly assists the solution of an apparently completely
unrelated applied research problem. Among the more recent ones, Moody (1995) describes
in detail the numerous strands of basic research which allowed the creation of the ubiquitous
CD. A central plank of the theory of relativity, that light is bent by gravity, is also a building
block of GPS navigation system (Haustein 2009). The abstract mathematical problem of
covering a surface with symmetric tiles lies at the foundation of our understanding and
exploitation of superconductors (Edelson 1992). Gauss’s investigation into the distribution
of prime number has led, with the contributions of many mathematical minds over the
course of two centuries, to the possibility of unbreakable cryptographic codes, without which
e-commerce would not be possible (du Satoy 2003). Table 3 in Gersbach et al (2009) has a
longer and more systematic list. An empirical investigation of the link between basic research
conducted in universities and commercial applications of the applied research it generated is
in Jensen and Thursby (2001).
3Of course in an international context, some of the beneﬁts determined by the expenditure
of one country’s taxpayers’ money do accrue to individuals in diﬀerent countries. This can
be captured by an increase in the shadow cost of public funds relative to the value it would
take in a closed economy.
3institutions receive an identical “block grant”, subject to a threshold level of
applied research. More eﬃcient institutions, those which can do this minimum
amount of applied research spending less than the “block grant” can therefore
use their savings to engage in basic research. When the social value of applied
research is suﬃciently high, additional funding is made available to institutions.
To receive it, an institution must carry out additional applied research, and,
crucially, the additional funding is lower than the cost of the additional applied
research to be carried out: institutions need to “co-fund” any further applied
research they wish to carry out. This is in contrast to the “cost-plus” approach
favoured by funding agencies in the UK, and its intuitive explanation is that,
since the government wants to push institutions to do applied research rather
than basic research, even when the institution’s cost of applied research is
higher that the cost of doing basic research, it oﬀers to fund the former, thus
reducing an institution’s cost.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section
3 the results. Section 4 shows how the policy can be implemented in practice,
and Section 5 concludes. Mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
I model the publicly funded research sector of an economy. There is a contin-
uum of institutions with the potential to do research their number normalised
without loss of generality to 1. A government agency has the task of fund-
ing their activities. Institutions diﬀer in their ability to spend public research





The value of θ for each institution is exogenously given. The distribution of
θ in the sector is described by a diﬀerentiable function F (θ), with density











The most natural interpretation for θ is the skill of an institution’s scientists,4
4In the simplest model, each institution is randomly assigned its staﬀ. In reality, of course,
institutions compete for staﬀ,w h i c hw o u l dm a k eθ endogenous. In a fully developed model
of the academic labour market, one would need to take into account the fact that researchers
prefer to join high quality institutions, and so competition among institutions might not
be based exclusively on salaries. Palomino and Sákovics (2004) is a model which combines
4but it can also encompass the institution’s ability to supplement government
funding with funds from private sources. These may include for example in-
come from endowments, or, for universities, generated from students’ tuition
fees, even though I do not model explicitly any technological complementarity
or ﬁnancial cross-subsidisation between teaching and research (see for example
De Fraja and Valbonesi 2008). Another example is of course the possible com-
mercial exploitation of research. Two institutions which diﬀer in this respect,
for example because of their contacts with industry, of the eﬀectiveness of their
technology transfer oﬃce (or marketing department), will be characterised by
diﬀerent values of θ.
2.1 Basic and applied research.
If funded, an institution can carry out two kinds of research, basic and ap-
plied. I assume that applied research aﬀects directly national income, whereas
basic research aﬀects it only indirectly via its eﬀect on the productivity of ap-
plied research. Both applied and basic exert their inﬂuence via their aggregate
amount, deﬁned here as follows. Let a(θ) and b(θ) denote the average amount
of applied and basic research, respectively, carried out in the institutions with
productivity θ.I d e ﬁne by A and B the total5 amount of applied research








b(θ)f (θ)dθ.( 2 )
We can interpret A exactly as a standard Solow residual, and, taking other
inputs as given, deﬁne national income as
Y (A),( 3 )
with Y 0 (A) > 0, Y 00 (A) 6 0. The link between a speciﬁc applied research
p r o j e c ta n dt h ec o n s e q u e n ti n c r e a s ei nn a t i o n a li n c o m ei sl e f ti m p l i c i t .A sa n
competition among institutions (sports leagues in their paper), with externalities among its
members (the individual teams).
5Notice that aggregate uncertainty disappears: even though speciﬁc research projects may
be uncertain, then (1) and (2) denote the expected and actual amount of successful research.
5example, consider a project consisting in the development of a new therapy.
It might be that the institution carrying out the project is a private proﬁt-
making pharmaceutical company receiving a government subsidy to research,
or a research centre or a university selling a patent through a TTO.6 In these
cases a direct impact of research on national output can be established. Alter-
natively, if the line of applied research is not fully appropriable and the beneﬁt
is more diﬀuse, consumers or other ﬁrms might beneﬁt directly, through new
products or lower costs and prices. An example could be an improvement in
communication technology, which beneﬁt all users.
I follow Gersbach et al (2010), who posit that aggregate amount of basic
research undertaken in society is a parameter of the function which gives the
probability of a successful innovation in each of the continuum of industries
where research is undertaken. Formally, in my model, a type θ research insti-
tution’s cost of carrying out the amount a of applied research and the amount
b of basic research is
ˆ c(a,b,θ,B).( 4 )
I simplify the above with the assumption that applied and basic research
enter the cost function in an additively separable manner. That is, ˆ cab (·)=0in
t h ee n t i r ed o m a i no fˆ c.T h i sr e ﬂects the unpredictability of the beneﬁcial eﬀects
of basic research, which makes completely diﬀuse the externality from basic to
applied research: each institution beneﬁts equally from basic research carried
out anywhere, and there is no complementarity between basic and applied
research within an institution. I also assume that there are constant returns to
scale in basic research, ˆ cbb (·)=0in the domain of ˆ c. The idea is that the cost
of a basic research project, in relation to its probability to succed, is diﬃcult
to assess, making it hard for institutions to “rank” projects according to their
“value for money”. In view of these, the cost function simpliﬁes to
ˆ c(a,b,θ,B)=c(a,θ,B)+bc
b (θ,B),
for some functions c and cb.
6The analysis of the role and eﬀects of Technology Transfers Oﬃces, outside the scope of
this paper, can be found for example, in Macho-Stadler et al (2007) and in the references
reported there.




, the functions c(a,θ,B)
and cb (θ,B) satisfy:
1. ca (·) > 0, cθ (·) > 0, cB (·) < 0, c(0,θ,B)=0 .
2. caa (·) > 0, cBB (·) > 0, caθ (·) > 0, cBa(·) 6 0.





4. cb (θ,B)=1 .
Assumption 1.1 simply deﬁnes θ as a measure of cost, captures the exter-
nality created by B,a n dr u l e so u tﬁxed costs. The second set of hypotheses are
natural decreasing returns to scale assumptions (caa (·) > 0 and cBB (·) > 0),
and that a lower θ and more basic research decrease the marginal cost, as well
as the total cost. Assumption 1.3 avoids unrewarding corner solutions by en-
suring that if there is no basic research in society then a very small amount
reduces the cost of research by more than it costs.
T h el a s tp a r to fA s s u m p t i o n1s t a t e st h a tt h ec o s to fd o i n gb a s i cr e s e a r c h
is independent of the productivity parameter, and then normalises it to 1,r e -
deﬁning if necessary the amount of basic research B. This assumption implies
that all institutions are equally good at doing basic research, and, while it
m i g h tb ea r g u e dt h a tt h i sr e ﬂects the nature of basic research,7 it does not
seem to tally with stylised facts. In fact, I introduce it not for realism, but to
separate incentive from eﬃciency considerations in the allocation of funding for
basic research. I show below in Proposition 3 that, in conditions of imperfect
information, low θ institutions, which are more eﬃcient in carrying out applied
research, do more basic research. This is not the case with symmetric informa-
tion. In view of Assumption 1.4 it is clear that this is not because they are also
b e t t e ra tb a s i cr e s e a r c h ,b u td u et oad i ﬀerent mechanism: the fact that the
funding agency’s information disadvantage forces it to oﬀer funding that insti-
tutions can use to pay for basic research in order to induce those institutions
that are eﬃcient at applied research to do more of it than they would like.
7Carried out by isolated group of researchers whose output is independent of their institu-
tional aﬃliation, like archetypical Gregor Mendels experimenting on pea plants in an abbey
in Brno.
72.2 Payoﬀ functions
I assume that a research institution’s objective is the maximisation of the total
amount of research it carries out, r, subject to any constraints it must satisfy:
r(θ)=a(θ)+b(θ).( 5 )
The additive form in (5) simply implies that the marginal rate of substi-
tution between applied and basic research is constant. Any preference that
i n s t i t u t i o n sm i g h th a v ei sn o r m a l i s e da w a y ,a n dt h es u b s t a n t i v ep a r to ft h e( 5 )
is that institutional preferences between basic and applied research vary neither
with their type θ,n o rw i t ht h ea m o u n to fb a s i ca n da p p l i e dr e s e a r c ht h e yd o .
The government chooses its research funding policy: the amount of funding
to basic and applied research, and the way to distribute this funding across
the various institutions. Formally, a research policy is a pair of functions,
{t(θ),a(θ)}θ∈[θ,¯ θ],w h e r et(θ) is the total funding given to institutions of type
θ and a(θ) is the amount of applied research they need to do in order to
receive that funding. Equivalently, since the amount of basic research in a
type θ institution is simply the diﬀerence t(θ) − c(a(θ),θ,B), a policy can
be written as {b(θ),a(θ)}θ∈[θ,¯ θ], the amount of basic and applied research in
at y p eθ institution, or also as {r(θ),a(θ)}θ∈[θ,¯ θ], the amount of total and
applied research in a type θ institution. The government’s objective function
is the total national income, reduced by the cost of funding the research sector,
which includes a distortionary component, plus the non-monetary beneﬁto f
research (prestige, etc.). Formally, the government’s payoﬀ function is
k(A + B)+Y (A) − (1 + λ)T.( 6 )
where k > 0 is the weight of the non-monetary beneﬁt of research, λ > 0
the shadow cost of public funds, and T =
R ¯ θ
θ t(θ)f (θ)dθ the total funding to




[r(θ) − a(θ)]f (θ)dθ.( 7 )
The following assumption ensures that research is suﬃciently important.
Assumption 2 For every A > 0,
Y 0(A)+k
1+λ > 1.
That is, the marginal social beneﬁto fapplied research exceeds the marginal
cost of basic research.
83R e s u l t s
3.1 Preliminaries
T h ev i e w p o i n to ft h i sp a p e ri sn o r m a t i v e :t h eg o v e r n m e n tn e e d st oc h o o s eh o w
to distribute the research budget across institutions and to direct institutions’
choice of the balance between applied and basic research. The government’s
maximisation problem is of course subject to information constraints, which
are discussed in detail below. Before I present the results, it is convenient to
deﬁne the amount of applied research which equates the marginal return on
applied and basic research.
Deﬁnition 1 a∗ (θ;B) is value of a which solves
ca (a,θ,B)=1 . (8)
That is, a∗ (θ;B) is the amount of applied research which maximises type θ
institution’s total research when the aggregate amount of basic research is B,
provided the budget available to the institution is large enough not to constrain
applied research; this can be deﬁned as the individually eﬃcient expenditure on








caa(·) > 0.T h a t
is, more eﬃcient institutions have a higher individually eﬃcient expenditure
on applied research, and an increase in the level of basic research increases the
individually eﬃcient expenditure on applied research for all universities. This
seems natural and has been dubbed “crowding in” of basic research (Malla and
Gray 2005, p 434).
3.2 Perfect information
The ﬁrst proposition gives the benchmark case in which the government fully
and freely observe the productivity and the research activities of each institu-
9tion. Let a1 (θ), A1 and B1 be deﬁned by:













cB (a1 (θ),θ,B 1)f (θ)dθ +1 .( 1 1 )
By Assumption 2,
Y 0(A1)+k
1+λ > 1,a n ds oa1 (θ) >a ∗ (θ;B).
Proposition 1 If the government could observe perfectly the productivity of
each institution and the amount of applied and basic research each institution
carries out, it would choose: a1 (θ), and any function r(θ) > a1 (θ) such that
R ¯ θ
θ r(θ)f (θ)dθ = A1 + B1.
The proofs of all results are relegated to the Appendix. Notice that, since
−cB (a1 (θ),θ,0) > 1 > 1 − k
1+λ, by virtue of Assumption 1.3, and cBB (·) in
Assumption 1.2, then B1 determined in (11) is strictly positive.
Proposition 1 is straightforward: the government simply asks each institu-
tion to carry out a certain amount of applied research. Since
Y 0(A1)+k
1+λ > 1,b y
Assumption 2, this is more than a∗ (θ;B), what each institution would choose
if it were simply given a budget to spend as it pleases. This is what one would
expect: applied research is more beneﬁcial to the government than to institu-
tions, and so the government want institutions to do more than they would like.
By (9), the marginal cost of doing applied research is the same in every insti-
tution. This is eﬃcient; if it were not the case, the government could transfer
research from one institution to another and reduce the overall cost of a given
total amount of applied research.




caa(·) < 0. They are better at it, so this is natural. Equally natural is the
fact that the distribution of basic research across universities is a matter of
indiﬀerence.8 Since all institutions are equally productive at basic research,
8Without Assumption 1.4, a∗ (θ;B) would be deﬁned not by (8), but by the solution in
a to ca (a,θ,B)=cb (θ,B); in this case the government would allocate basic research to the
lowest cost institutions only, or, assuming also decreasing returns to scale in basic research,
10the government determines the total amount of basic research in (11) and then





. Lastly, note that an increase in k a n dar e d u c t i o ni nλ increase




,t h u si n c r e a s i n gA1 and B1.
3.3 Information asymmetry.
I now consider a more realistic information structure. Speciﬁcally, I assume
that the government can observe neither θ, an institution’s productivity, nor b,
the amount of basic research it does. Instead, the government can observe, and
an external adjudicator can verify, whether an agreed level of applied research
eﬀort a has been performed.
This schematic assumption captures essential features of the two types of
research eﬀort discussed above. The funding agency, like any observer external
to the institution, is able to verify whether or not resources destined to applied
research have in fact been spent on applied research: evidence of expenditure on
laboratories, data collection, research assistants’ time and so on can be audited,
even when, due to the uncertain nature of the research process, no tangible
result is obtained. The same, however, is less true of basic research: if a funding
body were to request an institution to destine a certain amount of resources
to basic rather than applied research, against the institution’s preferences, it
would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to verify whether that request has been complied with:
a requirement imposed on an institution to, say, hire a theoretical researcher
can be easily circumvented. Similarly, requiring a researcher to do blue sky
thinking must entail that she is given the freedom to choose any project that
stimulates her curiosity: including, necessarily, applied projects, even though
they are not speciﬁcally funded. In other words, it is easier to devote to applied
research resources intended by the funding agency for basic research, than the
other way round.
Ar e l a t e dd i ﬃculty would emerge if a government tried to induce its pre-
ferred combination of applied and basic research by rewarding past achieve-
ment. It is much more diﬃcult to do so for basic than for applied research.
in such a way to equalise the marginal cost of basic research. The other qualitative features
of the analysis would not change.
11Consider the latter. One can think that an institution carrying out a large
portfolio of applied research projects, only some of which will succeed. The
aggregate uncertainty in the portfolio cancels out, and the ex-ante expected
output of the portfolio is approximately equal to the actual output, which,
considering that applied research projects have a shorter time horizon, be-
comes observable relatively soon: if the government’s funding agency rewards
the institution for its output it is eﬀectively rewarding eﬀort and quality. The
very nature of basic research is such that this is not true in its case. Some em-
pirical evidence suggests that basic research expenditure is a more important
productivity determinant thana p p l i e dr e s e a r c h( e . g . ,M a n s ﬁeld (1980); Link
(1981); Griliches 1986), and yet, the very long time gap and the often extremely
tenuous link between research results and their impact (see the examples given
in footnote 2) make it simply impossible to reward the observed success of ba-
sic research eﬀort in a way that reﬂect its contribution to society. To sum up,
research eﬀort is more observable for applied research.9 The formal implication
for the model is that the government policy can impose a ﬂoor but not a ceiling
on the amount of applied research: it can condition the amount of funding on
observing at least a speciﬁed minimum amount of applied research; but the
institution can “hide” its applied research if it does more than the speciﬁed
minimum.10
The next result illustrates that, per se, this kind of unobservability does not
limit the policy of the government.
Corollary 1 If the government can only observe whether at least a certain
amount of applied research has been carried out, but can observe perfectly the
type of the institution, then it would choose a1 (θ) and any function b(θ) > 0
9Note that peer review based formal evaluation mechanisms such as the Research Assess-
ment Exercise in the UK are intended to assess the research eﬀort of institutions, both in
applied and in basic research. The current version of the exercise also attempts to measure
the impact of research on society.
10As a speciﬁc example, consider the use of the budget of a social scientist (including her
salary): suppose I want her to devote half of it to applied and half to basic research. I can
ask her to spend some time collecting and organising, data, and knowing the technology she
uses, I can determine that (at least) half her budget was indeed devoted to the task. But
this is not so with the rest of her time: was she trying out diﬀerent things with her data? or
speculating on some abstract problems?
12such that
R ¯ θ
θ b(θ)f (θ)dθ = B1.
That is, the optimal policy when the government is unable to observe basic
research is exactly as in Proposition 1, when it can observe the nature of the
research carried out. The reason is straightforward: the government wants each
institution to carry out the appropriate amount of applied research, and oﬀers
individualised contracts to each institution with this requirement. Since these
contracts require a minimum amount of applied research higher than what
the institution would do on its own (a1 (θ) >a ∗ (θ;B)), they are incentive
compatible. Basic research, the cost of which is independent of the institution
where it is carried out, is distributed in any feasible way.
This policy, however, cannot be implemented if the government cannot ob-
serve each institution’s productivity parameter, θ. The reason is that Proposi-
tion 1 and Corollary 1 require each institution to choose a combination of basic
and applied research eﬀort such that applied research has a higher marginal
cost than basic research, and so, if institutions were simply asked to do a1 (θ)
and b(θ), they would have an incentive to claim to have a higher θ than they
have. By doing so, they would be able to increase the total amount of research
they do with their funding, as they can carry out less of the more costly applied
research. Formally, presented with the link between a funding level and a1 (θ),




1 (a∗ (θ;B)), ¯ θ
ª
.I nt h i s
way, its marginal cost of doing applied research is as near as possible to 1,i t s
marginal cost of basic research.
3.4 Incentive Compatibility
In this subsection, I determine the constraints imposed by the information
disadvantage of the government. I take the standard revelation approach. It is
as if the government asked each institution to report its own type, and commits
to imposing a vector of variables as functions of the reported type; by the
revelation principle, the government cannot improve on the payoﬀ it can obtain
by restricting its choices to policies that satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint, that is the property that no institution has an incentive to misreport
its type. This constraint is derived in Proposition 2. Recall that a policy can
be written as {r(θ),a(θ)}θ∈[θ,¯ θ],w i t hr(θ) and a(θ) the total and the applied




. Basic research follows
from r(θ)=a(θ)+b(θ).
Proposition 2 Ap o l i c y{r(θ),a(θ)}θ∈[θ,¯ θ] is feasible and incentive compatible









˙ a(θ) 6 0, (13)
a(θ) − a
∗ (θ;B) > 0, (14)
r(θ) − a(θ) > 0. (15)
3.5 The optimal funding policy
I am now in a position to present the government maximisation problem. This
is the choice of a policy {r(θ),a(θ)},w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the constraints given in
Proposition 2 and maximises the government objective function. As in Section
3.2, A and B, the aggregate amount of applied and basic research are best
treated as parameters chosen by the government, subject of course to (1) and
(7), their deﬁnition as the sum of applied and basic research carried out in
all universities. Requirement (14), that a(θ) >a ∗ (θ;B), implies that the
government might want to exclude some institutions. As the proof shows, if





, is itself a choice variable.




Y (A)+k(A + B) − (1 + λ)
Z θ0
θ
[c(a(θ),θ,B)+r(θ) − a(θ)]f (θ)dθ
s.t.: (12), (13), (14), (15), (7), (1). (16)
I can now derive the optimal funding policy. This is based on three func-
tions, a∗ (θ;B) deﬁned above, and aK (θ;B,β) and r∗ (θ;B,θ0),d e ﬁned next.







cθa (a,θ,B).( 1 7 )
14The curve aK (θ;B,β) is drawn in Figures 1 and 2, and is intuitively discussed
following Corollary 2. Next, let r∗ (θ;B,θ0) be the solution to the following
diﬀerential equation:
˙ r(θ)=−cθ (r(θ),θ,B), r(θ0)=a
∗ (θ0;B).( 1 8 )
That is, for given B, r∗ (θ;B,θ0) is the function r(θ) which satisﬁes the incen-
tive compatibility constraint “shifted” to intersect a∗ (θ;B) at θ = θ0.
Assumption 3 (i) cθ (·) >
caθ(·)












cθaa (·) > 0.
The ﬁrst two statements in Assumption 3 impose restrictions on the cost
structure. Loosely speaking, they require cθ (·) to be “large”, that is that cost
diﬀerences among institutions, measured by the parameter θ,a r es u ﬃcient im-
portant. But θ is unobservable, and measures the diﬀerences in productivity
among institutions, and therefore the ﬁrst two statements in Assumption 3
simply require that information disadvantage of the government be suﬃciently
important. It is this disadvantage that makes the analysis relevant: in the
extreme polar case where all research institutions are identical, the govern-
ment’s inability to observe their productivity is obviously not a problem. Of
course, the considerable eﬀort that funding agencies exert to ascertain the re-
search potential of the research institutions they sustain suggests strongly that
these diﬀerences are important in practice. The third statement is a regularity
restriction.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. If problem (16) has a solution, then
there exist ˜ θ,θK ∈ (θ,θ0] with θ < θK 6 ˜ θ 6 θ0 such that:
if θ ∈ [θ,θK) then a(θ) >a












∗ (θ;B) and b(θ)=0 .
The following implication of Proposition 3 is worth illustrating formally, as
it helps illustrating the optimal policy in a diagram.
15Corollary 2 Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. If a solution to problem (16) exists,
































The optimal policy described in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 is depicted
in Figure 1. In each panel of the Figure, the vertical axis measures the amount
of research at the optimal policy, and the horizontal axis an institution’s pro-
ductivity parameter, θ. Only institutions with θ below θ0, the intersection
of r∗ (θ;B,θ0) and a∗ (θ;B), receive any government funding. In each panel,
there are three diﬀerent curves. The solid thin line is the locus r∗ (θ;B,θ0):
by Proposition 2, it represents the total amount of research carried out by a
type θ institution. The dotted line is locus a∗ (θ;B), and the dashed line is
aK (θ;B,β). By Corollary 2, the amount of applied research each institution
does is given by the higher of these two curves, if it is below r∗ (θ;B,θ0),a n d
otherwise by r∗ (θ;B,θ0) itself. In the latter case, the institution does no basic
research. In both panels, the red thick curve is the amount of applied research
carried out by a type θ institution, and the distance between the latter curve
and r∗ (θ;B,θ0), shaded in grey in the diagrams, is the amount of basic research
carried out by a type θ institution.
T h ep a n e l so fF i g u r e1d i ﬀer in the position of the curve aK (θ;B,β).T h i s
determines three possible patterns of complementary slackness of the con-
straints in Problem 16, indicated by the white numbers in a black disk. In
region 1, both (14) and (15) are slack; in region 2, constraint (14) is binding.
In region 3, (15) is binding. The conceptual diﬀerence between regions 1 and
2 is that research institutions in region 2 choose their “preferred” combination
of applied and basic research, and those in region 1 are required/incentivised
to do more than this amount. In region 3 there are research institutions which
only do applied research.
When Assumption 2 is violated, applied research is less valuable; this pushes
down the curve aK (θ;B,β), and, if a solution exists, it will still satisfy Propo-
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Figure 1: Applied and basic research. High social value of applied research.
now illustrated by Figure 2: the most productive research institutions now do
carry out their preferred level of applied research, and if there are institutions
which are given an incentieve to do more than this, as in the right hand side
panel, they are the medium θ institutions.
T h e s eF i g u r e si l l u s t r a t eh o wt h ep a t t e r no ff u n d i n gi sd e t e r m i n e db yt h e
position of the curve aK (θ;B,β). From (17), it is evident that this is aﬀected by
four factors: the direct eﬀect of applied research on national income, Y 0 (A);t h e
direct “prestige” eﬀect of research on the policy maker’s payoﬀ, k;t h es h a d o w
cost of public funds λ;a n dﬁnally, the endogenously determined overall eﬀect
of basic research on institutions’ cost of doing applied research, β.T h e ﬁrst
three simply shift the dashed curve up and down in a parallel fashion (leaving
aside the indirect eﬀect through B). Thus, other things equal, increases in k
and in Y 0 (A) and decreases in λ all increase the amount of applied research,
and decrease the amount of basic research. The sign of the eﬀect for k and λ
follows from the fact that the cost of applied research is higher that that of basic
research, therefore, if research becomes more desirable, higher k,o rc h e a p e rt o
fund, lower λ, more of the “expensive” type, applied research will be done.
17The term β determines the distortionary eﬀect of information asymmetry. It
is 0 with perfect information, as can be seen in the comparison between (17)
and (9). Notice that it changes the amount of basic research done by the
most eﬃcient institution: superﬁcially, this might appear in contrast to the
“eﬃciency at the top” principle. In fact, information asymmetry aﬀects the
total amount of basic research that it is optimal to carry out, and therefore the
socially optimal amount of applied research that the most eﬃcient institution
should do. A positive value of β increases the amount done by more eﬃcient
institutions, and reduces (more) the amount carried out by less eﬃcient ones.
For higher values of θ,h o w e v e rt h i se ﬀect is reduced by the incentive eﬀect:
in order to induce institutions to self-select, it is necessary to prevent high
type universities from pretending to be low type, and thus doing less applied
research and devote funds to the cheaper basic research: reducing suﬃciently
the amount of applied research makes this less attractive for a low θ institution.
Basic research is used to provide incentives for institutions to carry out applied
research in excess of a∗ (θ;B), via a link between total funding and the amount
of applied research done. This also explains why the number of institutions
funded is reduced by asymmetric information. High cost institutions, which
would do some research if the government could observe their type, cannot
however be funded when the government has imperfect information, lest more
eﬃcient institutions “pretend” to be ineﬃcient to avoid doing research in excess
of their eﬃcient level a∗ (·), as the government would like them to, and increase
their spending on basic research.
The next Section describes in detail how the link between applied research
and total funding can be implemented in practice. Before, I consider a special
case, which illustrates the role of the basic research externality.
Assumption 4 The cost function c(a,θ,B) is additively separable in (a,θ)
and B:t h e r ee x i s tˆ c(a,θ) and ζ (B) such that c(a,θ,B)=ˆ c(a,θ)+ζ (B) for
every (a,θ,B).
In words, B aﬀects only the ﬁxed cost of doing applied research.
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Figure 2: Applied and basic research. Low social value of applied research.
In contrast, recall that for the curve a∗ (θ;B),i ti sca (a∗ (·),θ,B)=1 .
Therefore by how much applied research is pushed above the eﬃcient level
in the most productive institutions, that is by how much the initial point of
the dashed curve aK (·) exceeds that of the the curve a∗ (θ;B) depends on the
extent by which,
Y 0(A)
1+λ , the marginal beneﬁto fa ni n c r e a s ei na p p l i e dr e s e a r c h ,
exceeds ζ0 (B)F (θ0), the marginal cost of an increase in basic research.
4 Implementation
This section investigates how a central funding agency can implement in prac-
tice the optimal policy derived in Proposition 2. As I have assumed, this agency
is constrained by the fact that basic research is unobservable: if an institution
wants, it is able to divert to applied research funding intended for basic re-
search. All an agency can therefore do is to provide a link between a target
amount of applied research carried out and the total amount of funding an
institution receives.
Formally, I want to derive the function C (a), which gives the total funding
19received as a function of the total amount of applied research carried out in an
institution. Since there is a one-to-one relationship between θ and a,t h i si sa
well deﬁned function.
The shape of this function depends on which the three regions identiﬁed in
Proposition 2 the optimal choice belongs. To see this, consider an institution of
type θ which, given policy {r(θ),a(θ)}θ∈[θ,¯ θ] chooses r(θ), a(θ) and therefore
it obtains total funding t(θ). In region 1, the total funding received by this













The ﬁrst term is the cost of carrying out aK (θ;B,β) amount of applied research
and the terms in the square brackets the cost of basic research. For ﬁxed B
and β,l e tθK (a;B,β) be the inverse of the function aK (θ;B,β): θK (a;B,β)
is the value of θ such that aK (θ;B,β)=a. Next, consider an institution
which, faced with a schedule C (a) chooses to carry out a (minimum) amount
a of applied research (which, if the policy is incentive compatible, has therefore











− a.( 1 9 )
Corollary 4 If a(θ)=θK (a;B,β),t h e nC (a) is increasing. C (a) is convex





Therefore C (a) is convex if the relative slope of the dashed and dotted
c u r v e si sa si nt h eL H So fF i g u r e1 ,c o n c a v ei fi ti sa si nt h eR H S .
T h es a m ep r o c e d u r ec a nb ea p p l i e dt od e r i v et h es h a p eo fC (a) in the other
regions. In region 2, let θ∗ (a;B) be the inverse function of a∗ (θ;B),s ot h a t




∗ (a,B);B,θ0) − a.( 2 0 )
11Notice that, faced with (19), a type θ institution does indeed want to carry out precisely
a = aK (θ;B,β) applied research. To see this, note that it will solve
max
a>0
max{a +[ C (a) − c(a,θ,B)],a ∗ (θ;B)},
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Figure 3: Implementation: The LHS of Figure 1.
Corollary 5 If a(θ)=a∗ (θ;B),t h e nC (a) is constant.
Finally region 3. Here with the same argument used for region 1, I show
that the function is again increasing and convex.
Corollary 6 If a(θ)=r∗ (θ;B,θ0),t h e nC (a) is increasing and convex. More-
over, at the boundary between region 1 and 3 the slope of C (a) is increasing in
a.
Having determined the slope of the function C (a), consider Figure 3, to see
how the funding agency can implement it in practice. The Figure shows the
cartesian space, with the amount of applied research on the horizontal axis,





aK (θ;B,β),a ∗ (θ;B)
ª¤
is the red thick line: points on
this locus represent combinations of funding and applied research which the
funding agency allows research institutions to choose from. It is drawn for
t h ec a s ew h e r et h er e l e v a n tr e g i o nf o rt h eh i g ht y p er e s e a r c hi n s t i t u t i o n si so f
type 2 (that is for the LHS panel of Figure 1). Here, as shown in Corollary
5, funding as a function of total applied research is constant. Also drawn on
the diagram are the indiﬀerence curves of for three institution types, and their
“ f e a s i b l es e t ” ,t h ec o m b i n a t i o n so ff u n d i n ga n dt h ea m o u n to fa p p l i e dr e s e a r c h
which an institution can carry out with that funding. Consider ﬁrst a type
θ0 institution, shown on the LHS panel. Its indiﬀerence curves are the solid
thin lines (they all reach a minimum at a = a∗ (θ0;B):t o t a l l y d i ﬀerentiate
a+t−c(a,θ0,B) to see this), and its feasible set is the grey shaded area (this
is the set {(a,t) ∈ R+|c(a,θ0,B) 6 t}). There is only one point available for
21this institution, the point on the red locus and on the “feasible set”, namely
(a∗ (θ0;B),C(a∗ (θ0;B))). Not so however for more productive research insti-
tutions: take type θ1 ∈ (θK,θ0), illustrated in the middle panel. Its indiﬀerence
curves are the dashed lines, and its feasible set again the grey area, clearly
bigger than a type θ0 institution’s. It can choose any point in the grey area
and on the red line. The best among such points is (a∗ (θ1;B),C(a∗ (θ1;B))),
point B in the diagram. Notice that, the required level of applied research,
a∗ (θ1;B), will cost it only c(a∗ (θ0;B),θ0,B), the vertical height of point A,
which is less that C (a∗ (θ1;B)): after paying for applied research, it is “left”
with some funding which it will spend on basic research. This has marginal
cost of 1, rather than applied research, which, if pushed above a∗ (θ1;B),w o u l d
have a marginal cost exceeding 1.A t y p e θ1 institution therefore carries out
an amount of basic research measured by the vertical distance between points
A and B.
Finally consider a very eﬃcient institution, one with cost parameter θ2 <
θK.I t se ﬃcient level of applied research is a∗ (θ2;B),a ss h o w nb yp o i n tA in
the RHS panel of the Figure. This is the level it would choose if funding were
constant. But the optimal policy is designed so that this institution does more
than this amount, as the funding agency oﬀers increasing funding for research
institutions which exceed their eﬃcient level of applied research: faced with the
red schedule, a type θ2 research institution chooses the combination that allows
it to be on the highest possible indiﬀerence curve, namely tangency point B
in the diagram.12 Note that the total cost incurred by this institution to carry
out the amount of applied research aK (θ2;B,β),s a yp o i n tC, is less than its
total amount of funding. It will spend the diﬀerence to pay for basic research,
which therefore is given by the distance between B and C: the vertical height
of point C measures the amount spent on applied research, and so the distance
12When the curve C (a) is convex, as in Figure 3, then the tangency point is a local, and
hence a global, maximum. To see this, note that, at the tangency point (a2,C(a2)),w i t h
a2 = aK (θ2;B,β), the slope of the indiﬀerence curve is given by ca (a,θ,B) − 1.T h es l o p e
of the funding schedule is given by (A12). In a neighbourhood of a2,w eh a v e :
ca (a2 + ε,θ2,B)−ca
¡
a2 + ε,θK (a2 + ε;B,β),B
¢
= caθ (a2 + ε,θ3,B)
¡
θ2 − θK (a2 + ε;B,β)
¢
.
For ε > 0 (resp ε < 0), the above is positive (negative), as aK (·) is decreasing and so θK (·)
is too. Clearly if the curve C (a) is concave, then the tangency point is a maximum.
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Figure 4: Implementation: The RHS of Figure 1.
between B and C is the amount of basic research that a type θ2 does.
When the relative position of the curves a∗ (θ0;B) and aK (θ;B,β) is in-
stead that shown in the RHS panel of Figure 1 the optimal funding can be
implemented by the schedule illustrated in Figure 4. This diﬀer from the top
panel only in that the initial part of the schedule is also increasing. Notice how
at y p eθ1 institution, illustrated in the middle panel of the Figure, spends all
of its budget on applied research, and still does more than its eﬃcient level. As
before, a very low cost institution, θ2 < θK, which would choose to spend an
amount given by the height of point A on applied research if it were on a ﬁxed
budget, chooses instead point B, and spends an amount equal to the vertical
height of point C on applied research and the distance between C and B on
basic research.
To end this discussion, it is worth noting that when the social value of
applied research is low, so that the position of the curve aK (θ;B,β) is as
depicted in the RHS panel of Figure 2, then the optimal policy is implemented
simply by a policy of constant funding: all research institutions that agree to
c a r r yo u ta tl e a s ta∗ (θ0;B) applied research, receive the funds necessary to pay
for it, which they can use in any way they choose. In this case the diagram
of the funding schedule looks exactly the same as the initial portion of the red





I consider next which mechanism can in practical terms be used to induce
institutions to choose one point on the red line. This is a dual funding mecha-
nism: there is a ﬁxed part, and a output related part. Speciﬁcally suppose that
all institutions which can carry out at least a∗ (θ0;B) applied research receive
23a lump sum t0 = c(a∗ (θ0;B),θ0,B). In addition, institutions can apply to
have speciﬁc projects funded through a grant. However, not all institutions
can apply for these grants, but, in order to qualify to apply institutions need
to carry out at least a∗ (θK;B) applied research. In this case it would receive
grant funding governed by the formula
g(a)=C (a + a
∗ (θK;B)) − c(a
∗ (θ0;B),θ0,B)
where g(a) is the amount of grant awarded for agreeing to carry out a units
of applied research, in addition to the qualifying level a∗ (θK;B).I t i s w o r t h
noting that, at least for amounts in excess of the qualifying level below a given
level, the amount awarded does not cover the additional cost. Formally.
Corollary 7 Suppose θK < ˜ θ = θ0.T h e r ee x i s t s∆ > 0 such that there exist
θ∆ > θK such that g(∆) <c (a∗ (θK;B)+∆,B,θ) − c(a∗ (θK;B),B,θ) for
every θ ∈ (θK,θ∆).
Graphically, consider Figure 3. According to the Corollary, the slope of the
r e dl i n ei nan e i g h b o u r h o o do fa∗ (θK;B), which gives the additional funding
received by an institution that just exceeds the qualifying level a∗ (θK;B),i s
less than the slope of the frontier at the same point, which given the additional
cost incurred by such an institution to exceed by a small amount the qualifying
level of applied research, a∗ (θK;B).
The mechanism illustrated in the above paragraph constitutes an instance
of the principle of co-funding by the grant funding agency and the institutions.
This is in contrast with the idea of full economic costing, used, among others,
by the research councils in the UK (RCUK/UUK 2010). According to this
principle, grants are over funded, that is the amount of the grant awarded for
applied research exceeds the cost to carry out that research. The rationale is
precisely to ensure that there is no cross-subsidisation among an institution’s
v a r i o u sa c t i v i t i e s .M yr e s u l t sh e r es h o w st h a tt h eo p t i m a lp o l i c yi sm o r es u b t l e
and that the beneﬁt of avoiding cross-subsidisation must be balanced with the
beneﬁt derived from designing incentives to delegate funding decisions to the
institutions with the private information necessary to take allocation decisions
eﬃciently. The principle of co-funding may be reversed for higher values of
a p p l i e dr e s e a r c h ,t h a ti sf o rv e r ye ﬃcient institutions, and indeed, unit funding
24might become impossible, if the curve C (a) is concave. For the other regions it
is possible to derive similar results, but the taxonomy of each case is of limited
interest.
5 Concluding Remarks
Developed countries spend around one ﬁfth of their R&D expenditure on basic
research (Gersbach 2009, p 114). Should they spend more? Less? The UK
government funds research via two separates channels, quality related funding
and research grants from the research councils, in a proportion of roughly 2/3
and 1/3. Is this ratio “right”? Also, research grants are less evenly distributed:
the top 25 universities received 85% of the research grant funding, and 75% of
quality related funding. Are these proportions “right”? Government agencies
typically award research grants on a cost plus principle, whereas charitable
bodies favour co-funding of research activities. Which is better?
The theoretical guidance necessary to answer these questions, and more
generally to establish a microeconomic foundation to any empirical study of
research funding is relatively scant. In this paper, I oﬀer a framework for the
provision of this guidance. I develop a model built on the ideas that research in-
stitutions can devote their research eﬀort to basic or applied research, which are
in a hierarchical relationship, that there are diﬀerences in research productivity
among institutions, and that the government aims to distribute its funding in
t h es o c i a l l yp r e f e r r e dm a n n e r ,w h i c hi ng e n e r a ld i ﬀers from the preferences of
individual institutions.
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27Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Divide the government objective function (6) by (1 + λ),
substitute (7) and the value of T to write the optimization problem as:
max
a(θ),r(θ),A,B





[c(a(θ),θ,B)+r(θ) − a(θ)]f (θ)dθ,( A 1 )
s.t. (1) and (7).
Next, following Leonard and van Long (1992, p 190), write (7) and (1) as
˙ b0 (θ)=[ r(θ) − a(θ)]f (θ), b0 (θ)=0 , b0 ¡¯ θ
¢
= B,( A 2 )
˙ a0 (θ)=a(θ)f (θ), a0 (θ)=0 , a0 ¡¯ θ
¢
= A.( A 3 )
Ignoring for the moment the constraint r(θ)−a(θ) > 0, the Lagrangian for (A1) is:
L(·)=−[c(a(θ),θ,B)+r(θ) − a(θ)]f (θ)+[ σa(θ)+( 1− β)(r(θ) − a(θ))]f (θ),
where σ and (1 − β) are the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (A3) and (A2). I
write the multiplier of (A2) as (1 − β) to lighten notation. The ﬁrst order conditions
give (see Leonard and van Long, 1992, Theorem 7.11.1, p 255):
∂L
∂a(θ)
=[ −ca (a(θ),θ,B)+1+σ − (1 − β)]f (θ)=0 ,
∂L
∂r(θ)
=( −1+( 1− β))f (θ)=0 ,
σ =
k + Y 0 (A)
1+λ
,







Rearranging, β =0 , and the result follows.
Proof of Corollory 1. The problem in this case is the same as (A1), with the added
constraint a(θ) > a∗ (θ;B). At the solution of problem (A1) derived in Proposition
1, this constraint is slack and so the solution found there remains a solution for the
new problem.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Notice ﬁrst of all that b(θ) must be non-negative, and
so (15) must hold. For policy {r(θ),a(θ)} to be incentive compatible, every type θ
institution must (weakly) prefer to report to be of type θ that to pretend of to be of




. This determines (12). To see how, begin to note that by




, institution of type θ receives an amount of funds
for applied research a(x) and a total research funding c(a(x),x,B)+r(x)−a(x)=
c(a(x),x,B)+b(x). Total cost is observable, and so the institution needs to choose
research levels such that its total cost equals the last expression. So if a institution









a a + c(a(x),x,B)+r(x) − a(x) − c(a,θ,B),
s.t.: a > a(x).
Which has solution aL = a∗ (θ;B) if a∗ (θ;B) > a(x),a n daL = a(x) if a∗ (θ;B) <
a(x).T h a ti s :
aL =m a x{a∗ (θ;B),a(x)},




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
a∗ (θ;B)+c(a(x),B,x)+r(x) − a(x) − c(a∗ (θ;B),θ,B),
if a∗ (θ;B) > a(x),
a(x)+c(a(x),x,B)+r(x) − a(x) − c(a(x),θ,B),






⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(ca (a(x),x,B) − 1) ˙ a(x)+cθ (a(x),x,B)+˙ r(x),
if a∗ (θ;B) > a(x),
ca (a(x),x,B) ˙ a(x)+cθ (a(x),x,B)+˙ r(x) − ca (a(x),θ,B),
if a∗ (θ;B) <a(x).
For incentive compatibility, this needs to be maximised at x = θ. Evaluating the





cθ (a(x),x,B)+˙ r(x) if a∗ (θ;B) > a(x),
cθ (a(x),x,B)+˙ r(x) if a∗ (θ;B) <a(x).
A2The ﬁr s tl i n eh o l d sb e c a u s et h eo p t i m a la when a∗ (θ;B) > a(x) is a∗ (θ;B) and
ca (a∗ (θ;B),x,B) − 1=0 : this establishes (12).
Now (13): following Laﬀont and Tirole (1993, p 121), for a policy to be incentive







= −caθ (a(x),θ,B) ˙ a(x) > 0,
given our assumption that caθ (a(x),θ,B) > 0, (13) must hold.
Finally, (14). This follows from
d(c(a(θ),θ,B)+r(θ) − a(θ))
dθ
6 0.( A 4 )
This is the constraint that total funding be decreasing in θ.I fi tw e r en o tt h ec a s e ,
then an institution could simply claim to have a higher θ than it has, thus receiving a
higher funding, which it could spend on unobservable basic research. Expand (A4):
ca (a(θ),θ,B) ˙ a(θ)+cθ (a(θ),θ,B)+˙ r(θ) − ˙ a(θ) 6 0
which, using (12), becomes
[ca (a(θ),θ,B) − 1] ˙ a(θ) 6 0,
since ˙ a(θ) 6 0, ca (a(θ),θ,B) must exceed 1, which is (14).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .Begin by noting that a(θ) ∈ [a∗ (θ;B),r(θ)], and there-
fore a solution exists only for values of θ such that r(θ) > a∗ (θ;B),t h a ti sf o r
θ 6 θ0 at the candidate solution. This is because, by virtue of Assumption 3(i),
r(θ) >a ∗ (θ;B) to the left of their intersection, θ0. As in Proposition 1, divide the
maximand of problem (16) by (1 + λ), and construct the Lagrangian.
L(·)=− [c(a(θ),θ,B)+r(θ) − a(θ)]f (θ) − µ(θ)cθ (a(θ),θ,B)+
γ (θ)(a(θ) − a∗ (θ;B)) + π(θ)(r(θ) − a(θ))+
[(1 − β)(r(θ) − a(θ)) + σa(θ)]f (θ),( A 5 )
where µ(θ), γ (θ), π (θ), are the multipliers associated to constraints (12), (14), and
(15) respectively. As before (1 − β) > 0 and σ > 0 are the multipliers for (A2) and
A3(A3). I have ignored constraint (13): it will be seen to be satisﬁed at the solution










=[ −ca (a(θ),θ,B)+β + σ]f (θ)+γ (θ) − π(θ)
− µ(θ)cθa (a(θ),θ,B)=0 .( A 7 )
(A6) has solution:







d˜ θ.T h eﬁrst order conditions for A and B are the
same as in Proposition 1, giving σ =
k+Y 0(A)
1+λ . Expand the condition on (1 − β),
















Integration by parts gives:
1 − β =
k
1+λ














1 − β =
k
1+λ − cB (a(θ0),θ0,B)F (θ0)
1 −
R θ0












θ F (θ)cθB (·)dθ
.( A 9 )





γ (θ) − π (θ)
f (θ)
−




Next notice that β > 0. To see this, notice that (1 − β) measures the beneﬁt
of relaxing the constraint b(θ) > 0, which has a cost, measured in social value of
monetary units, of 1. Notice that the funding agency can always increase b(θ) if it
wants, because it can simply increase the funding to all research institutions, and,
since at the optimum they all do at least a∗ (θ;B), they all prefer to spend the
additional funding on basic research. Therefore the beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n gb(θ) cannot
exceed the cost at the optimum: (1 − β) 6 1.
A4Now deﬁne the function aK





βF (θ) − Π
f (θ)
cθa (a,θ,B). (A11)
If Π =0 ,t h e naK
Π (θ;B,β)=aK (θ;B,β) and if Π > 0,t h e naK
Π (θ;B,β) >
aK (θ;B,β),s i n c ecθa (·) > 0.
Next notice that depending on the combination of complementary slackness for
constraints (14) and (15), a value of a(θ) belongs to one of four possible regions:
1. a(θ) − a∗ (θ;B) > 0 and r(θ) − a(θ) > 0. Therefore, γ (θ)=π(θ)=0 ,
which means r(θ) >a(θ) >a ∗ (θ;B), and in this region, r(θ)=r∗ (θ;B,θ0),
a(θ)=aK
Π(θ) (θ;B,β).
2. γ (θ) > 0 and r(θ) − a(θ) > 0. Here, a(θ) − a∗ (θ;B)=0and π (θ)=0 ,a n d
so r(θ)=r∗ (θ;B,θ0), a(θ)=a∗ (θ;B).
3. a(θ)−a∗ (θ;B) > 0 and π (θ) > 0.I nt h i sr e g i o nγ (θ)=0and r(θ)=a(θ)=
r∗ (θ;B,θ0).
4. γ (θ) > 0 and π(θ) > 0. Here, r(θ)=r∗ (θ;B,θ0)=a∗ (θ;B)=a(θ),a n d
therefore this region is just the single intersection point between a∗ (θ;B) and
r∗ (θ;B,θ0).










then a(θ) > 0 and b(θ)=0 .
Proposition 3 requires that θ belongs to regions 1 or 2, that is that a(θ) ∈ [a∗ (θ,B),r∗ (θ;B,θ0)).









and so B =0 , against the Inada condition. That is, there is ˜ θ > θ0 such that
a(θ)=aK














. Now we show that at any intersection be-
tween r∗ (θ;B,θ0) and aK
Π(θ) (θ;B,β) the latter is less steep than r∗ (θ;B,θ0),a n d
thus we obtain a contradiction: if aK
Π(θ) (θ;B,β) is less steep than r∗ (θ;B,θ0) then
it must be above it in a right neighbourhood of ˜ θ.
Lemma A1 aK
Π (θ;B,β) >r ∗ (θ;B,θ0) for θ > ˜ θ.
A5Proof. To see this, compare aK
Π (θ,B,g) and r∗ (θ;B,θ0) at their intersection. Since
we are assuming that a(θ) >r ∗ (θ;B,θ0),w eh a v eπ(θ)=dΠ
dθ =0 .M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e









































































− cθaa (·)cθ (·)
⎞









∂θ ,t h a ti sr∗ (·) is steeper, and so it is below aK (·) in a
right neighbourhood of their intersection. The contradiction establishes the Lemma.
The Proposition now follows immediately.
Proof of Corollary 2. Proposition 3 shows that a(θ) is one of a∗ (θ;B), aK (θ;B,β)
or r∗ (θ;B,θ0). Moreover, since it must lie between a∗ (θ;B) and r∗ (θ;B,θ0),i tc a n
only equal aK (θ;B,β) — intersections excepted — between them. The second line
follows from the ﬁrst.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 .Omitted.






A6The above is positive because aK (θ;B,β) exceeds a∗ (θ;B). C is therefore increasing.
For the second part of the statement, expand C00 (a):











P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y5 . The derivative of (20) is:









as ca (·)=1along a∗ (θ;B).
Proof of Corollary 6. Let θr (a;B,θ0) be the inverse function of r∗ (θ;B,θ0),a n d
total funding is given by (recall that b(θ)=0in this region):
C (a)=c(a,θr (a,B,θ0),B). (A13)





= ca (·) − 1.




.T oe s t a b -
lish convexity, take C00 (a):








∂θ = −cθ (·).
For the second part of the statement, note that, in region 3 (that is to the left of
their intersection), the slope of C (a) is ca (a,θr (a;B,θ0),B)−1.I nr e g i o n1 ,n a m e l y




− 1.C o n s i d e ra
right neighbourhood of their intersection: the diﬀerence in slope is






θr (a;B,θ0) − θK (a;B,β)
¢
. (A14)
This is positive, since θr (a;B,θ0) − θK (a;B,β) > 0, establishing the statement.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y7 .Omitted.
A7